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INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment in educational institutions has been a salient issue in
education policy and victim advocacy on a state and federal level since the
late 1950s.1 Harassment of any kind has adverse effects on the learning and
1. “Sexual harassment” is used throughout to include acts of sexual violence
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development experience that students receive at an educational institution.2
Numerous studies in recent years have shown how sexual harassment in
educational institutions has particularly lasting educational, health, social,
and economic implications for its victims.3 The issue of sexual harassment
in educational institutions has been acknowledged since the civil rights era;
however, no meaningful federal legislation existed to combat the problem
until Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.4 Prior
to promulgating these federal protections for students, the federal
government established protections against sexual harassment in the
workplace with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5
New federal guidance and state laws have broadened protections for
individuals covered under Title IX.6 Recently, the Third Circuit expanded
the protections provided under Title IX by deciding that an employee at a
teaching hospital can bring a sexual harassment claim under both statutes.7
This Comment argues that the Third Circuit was incorrect in determining
that medical residents can sue under either statute, and that the Fifth Circuit

including assault. See Eilene Zimmerman, Campus Sexual Assault: A Timeline of Major
Events, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/23/education/
campus-sexual-assault-a-timeline-of-major-events.html (compiling a list of major sexual
assault cases from 1957 to 2016).
2. See Beverly M. Black & Cecilia Mengo, Violence Victimization on a College
Campus: Impact on GPA and School Dropout, 18 J. OF C. STUDENT RETENTION: RES.,
THEORY & PRAC. 234, 242-46 (2015) (analyzing the impact of sexual harassment on
victims’ academic performance and school retention).
3. See CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS, ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) viii
(Oct. 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Nat’l Crim. Just. Reference Serv.)
(examining the prevalence, nature, and reporting of sexual harassment experienced by
students on college campuses).
4. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-83, 1685-88 (1972) (codifying protections against
discrimination on the basis of sex in educational institutions).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2010) (codifying protections against discrimination on
the basis of sex in the workplace); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2018) (establishing sexual
harassment as a violation of section 703 of Title VII).
6. See Lavinia M. Weizel, Note, The Process That Is Due: Preponderance of the
Evidence as the Standard of Proof for University Adjudications of Student-on-Student
Sexual Assault Complaints, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1642-45 (2012) (advocating for
continued clarification and guidance surrounding the protections provided under Title
IX).
7. John Barry and Edna Guerrasio, A Circuit Split At Intersection of Title VII And
Title IX, LAW360 (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/913845/a-circuitsplit-at-intersection-of-title-vii-and-title-ix (explaining this change is significant because
Title IX does not require administrative exhaustion and has a better statute of
limitations).
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was correct in establishing that Title VII provides the sole remedy for
medical residents to sue for sexual harassment.8 This Comment examines
the reasons future courts should defer to the Fifth Circuit’s decision.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief legislative history of Title VII and
Title IX and introduces the cases related to each statute.9 Part I also
introduces the circuit court cases that address whether Title VII provides the
sole remedy to individuals who wish to bring a sexual harassment claim in a
teaching hospital.10 Part II supports the Fifth Circuit’s assertion that Title
VII and its subsequent case law preempts Title IX as a remedy for employees
of educational institutions who have experienced discrimination on the basis
of sex.11 Part III discusses the policy recommendation for why Title IX
should not provide a bypass to Title VII’s well-established remedial process
for addressing cases of discrimination on the basis of sex in teaching
hospitals.12 Part IV concludes that the Fifth Circuit is correct in this circuit
split.13
I.

BACKGROUND

The Federal Government has made strides to promote the rights of victims
of sexual harassment by carefully balancing the needs of survivors with the
rights of accused parties under Title IX.14 Over the past twenty years, there
have been various legislative efforts to protect victims of sexual
harassment.15 Discrimination against employees on the basis of sex was
outlawed in the United States with the passing of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.16
A decade later, Congress also outlawed discrimination on the basis of sex in
8. See id. (describing the Third Circuit’s view that medical residents should be able
to recover under both Title VII and Title IX).
9. Infra Part I.
10. Infra Part I.
11. Infra Part II.
12. Infra Part III.
13. Infra Part IV.
14. See Lauren Sieben, Education Dept. Issues New Guidance for Sexual-Assault
Investigations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., (Apr. 4, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/
Education-Dept-Issues-New/127004/ (explaining the evolving guidelines under Title
IX).
15. See HEATHER M. KARJANE ET AL., NAT’L INST. JUST., SEXUAL ASSAULT ON
CAMPUS: WHAT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES ARE DOING ABOUT IT ii, 1-2 (2005),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/205521.pdf (acknowledging the efforts made to
protect victims of sexual assault utilizing Title IX and accompanying legislation).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2010) (outlawing discrimination based on sex, race,
color, nationality, and religion).
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educational institutions by passing Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972.17 Since then, the federal government has worked to expand and
clarify the protections available to individuals who experience sexual
harassment in the workplace and within educational institutions.18
A. Overview of Employment Discrimination Law Under Title VII and
Title IX
1.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act made it unlawful for employers to
discriminate against employees with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment based on sex, race, color, national
origin, and religion.19 Following the enactment of this federal law, the
Supreme Court affirmed the statutorily-established protection against
discrimination on the basis of sex in the Supreme Court case Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson.20 In this case, the Supreme Court established that, under
Title VII, an employee has the right to be free from a “hostile environment”
created by occurrences of discrimination on the basis of sex.21 Numerous
types of sexual harassment can create a “hostile environment,” including but
not limited to quid pro quo sexual harassment, in which certain acts and
sexual harassment are linked to granting or denying of specific economic
17. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 168-83, 1685-88 (1972) (prohibiting discrimination that
excludes an individual from participation in, or denies an individual the benefits of, any
educational program or activity that receives federal financial assistance).
18. See generally Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence from Sec’y for the Office
of Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 1-19 (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr /letters/ colleague-201104.pdf (providing executive guidance
expanding the rights of survivors in disciplinary processes at higher education
institutions); New Requirements Imposed by the Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC. 1-3 (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.acenet.edu/
news-room/Documents/VAWA-Summary.pdf (providing guidance on the 2013
reauthorization of VAWA, which extended protections for victims of sexual harassment
in educational institutions).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2 (2010) (applying generally to employers with
fifteen or more employees, including federal, state, and local governments; private and
public colleges and universities; employment agencies; and labor organizations).
20. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59-61, 73 (1986) (discussing
that plaintiff sued employer after her dismissal, alleging that she was subjected to sexual
harassment during four years of employment and arguing that this harassment created a
“hostile working environment” as defined by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
21. Id. at 65 (relying, in part, on Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
guidelines, which identify two types of sexual harassment that constitute discrimination
on the basis of sex in the workplace: quid pro quo and hostile environment).
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employment benefits.22
However, the hostile environment sexual
harassment theory establishes that sexual harassment in the workplace can
create a hostile or offensive work environment even when economic benefits
are not readily affected or perceived to be affected.23
2.

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972

Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to
protect students and employees of educational institutions from sexual
harassment.24 Although there is no specific language in Title IX that
explicitly mentions protection from any form of sexual violence, the
Supreme Court later interpreted Title IX to include protection against sexual
harassment.25 The two seminal cases that imbued Title IX with the authority
to protect against sexual violence in educational institutions were Gebser v.
Lago Vista Independent School District and Davis v. Monroe County Board
of Education.26 In Gebser v. Lago Vista, Alida Gebser, a high school student,
had a sexual relationship with one of her teachers.27 Through this case, the
Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether the plaintiff
can recover damages.28 In Davis v. Monroe County, fifth grader LaShonda
Davis was sexually harassed by a fellow student.29 The Supreme Court
22. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN (1979) (voicing the disadvantages of a hostile work environment created by
sexual harassment).
23. Compare Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 65-66 (contending that women can
suffer psychological harm from harassment whether it results in the loss of a job benefit
or not), with Davis v. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650, 653-54 (1999) (determining that
sexual harassment creates a hostile environment, depriving students of the benefits or
participation in an educational program or activity on the basis of sex).
24. See 20 U.S.C. §1681 (stating that this statute was meant to protect any person
from being excluded from participation, denied the benefits, or subjected to
discrimination from any educational program or activity receiving federal funds).
25. See id.; see also Davis, 526 U.S. at 650, 653-54 (holding schools may be liable
for student-on-student harassment under Title IX); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292-93 (1998) (holding a school was not liable for harassment by a
teacher under Title IX absent actual notice and deliberate indifference).
26. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 653-54; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292-93.
27. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277-79 (narrating that Gebser sued the district under
Title IX seeking damages for being subjected to sex-based discrimination in an education
program).
28. See id. at 290-91 (requiring plaintiffs to show that first, the school knew of the
harassment and second, that the school deliberately failed to respond to the known
harassment in order to succeed on a Title IX claim).
29. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 633-34 (stating that Davis’s mother sued on her behalf
alleging that officials from the Monroe County Board of Education failed to address the

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol27/iss1/3

6

Martinez: Following the Fifth Circuit

2018]

FOLLOWING THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

79

found that the school officials might have acted with “deliberate
indifference” in response to Davis’s complaints of harassment, depriving
LaShonda of an education free from sex-based discrimination promised
under Title IX, and therefore reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of her
complaint.30 Although these cases were collectively a step forward toward
the goal of protecting victims of sex-based harassment, the cases set a high
bar for a plaintiff to successfully recover damages through a Title IX claim.31
B. Review of the Split Between the Third and Fifth Circuits
The case law from which this circuit split derives began with the 1994
Fourth Circuit case Preston v. Virginia.32 A year later, in Lakoski v. James,
the Fifth Circuit categorically disagreed with the Fourth Circuit.33 In 1996,
the Sixth Circuit sided with the Fourth Circuit in Ivan v. Kent State
University.34 In that same year, the Seventh Circuit sided with the Fifth
Circuit when the Seventh Circuit determined that Title VII is the “exclusive
avenue of relief” for employment discrimination claims by medical residents
who are employed at a teaching hospital.35 The most recent case to revive
this circuit split was the Third Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Mercy Catholic

harassment).
30. See id. at 686, 653-54 (affirming that victims of sexual harassment are denied
the equal access to education that Title IX means to protect by applying Davis’ factors
to student-on-student harassment).
31. See Grayson Sang Walker, Note, The Evolution and Limits of Title IX Doctrine
on Peer Sexual Assault, 45 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 95, 110-12 (2010) (emphasizing the
burdens for victims who attempt to seek relief for the sexual harassment they endure,
including establishing (1) that the school had knowledge of the harassment and acted in
deliberate indifference to addressing the harassment and (2) that the harassment created
a hostile environment that deprived the victim of the benefits of the educational program
or activity).
32. See Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 204-06 (4th
Cir. 1994) (discussing a case of employment discrimination on the basis of sex in which
an employee filed a claim against the college where she was employed alleging that the
college denied her applications for promotions in retaliation).
33. See Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 753, 758 (5th Cir. 1995) (concluding that
Title VII provides sole relief for sex-based employment discrimination for rights created
under Title VII).
34. See Ivan v. Kent State Univ., No. 94-4090 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 22269, at *58 (6th Cir. July 26, 1996) (holding that individuals can pursue a private right of action
for employment discrimination under Title IX, regardless of the availability of Title VII
remedies).
35. See Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 1996); Lakoski,
66 F.3d at 753, 758.
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Medical Center.36
1. The Third Circuit Held that Both Title VII and Title IX Provide a
Remedy for Employment Discrimination Claims on the Basis of Sex.
The most recent Third Circuit case reversed the preceding district court
case that concluded Title VII was the sole remedy for employees in federallyfunded education programs to bring claims of discrimination based on sex.37
In the case Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, plaintiff Jane Doe, a
former resident at Mercy Catholic Medical Center, brought claims of sex
discrimination, retaliation, and harassment against the private teaching
hospital where she previously worked as a medical resident.38 The Third
Circuit outlined four principles that guided the reversal, including that
Congress should determine whether it is undesirable to allow employees of
education programs to circumvent Title VII’s well-established
administrative requirements through Title IX.39 The Third Circuit arrived at
these four principles by relying on the Supreme Court cases of Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency Inc., Cannon v. University of Chicago, North
Haven Board of Education v. Bell, and Jackson v. Birmingham Board Of
Education.40

36. See Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 553-58 (3d. Cir. 2017) (joining
the Fourth and Sixth Circuit in determining that Title VII is not the sole remedy for
employment discrimination in teaching hospitals).
37. See id. at 553-58, 567 (reversing the district court’s decision that Title VII
provides the sole remedy to medical residents who could also bring the same claim under
Title VII).
38. See id. at 550-52 (alleging that the director of the hospital’s residency program,
Dr. James Roe, sexually harassed her and then retaliated against her after she reported
him to Human Resources, and Mercy Catholic allegedly responded by suspending and
then terminating Doe from its residency program).
39. See id. at 562-63 (determining that (1) medical residents are not limited to Title
VII as the sole remedy from employment discrimination; (2) if they are, Congress should
expressly determine that; (3) the provision in the statute that implies Title IX’s private
cause of action encompasses employees and students; and (4) the cause of action extends
to employees of federally-funded education programs who allege sex-based retaliation
claims).
40. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171, 173-75, 180 (2005)
(explaining the four guiding principles used by the Third Circuit to support its decision
that Doe could bring her claim under Title IX without filing a claim under Title VII);
North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 n.26 (1982) (finding Congress has
often instituted overlapping remedies); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 693-98
(1979) (finding a private cause of action implied in Title IX); Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency Inc., 421 U.S. 459, 461 (1975) (holding an individual alleging employment
discrimination is not deprived of remedies other than those available under Title VII);
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2. The Fifth Circuit Held that Title VII Provides the Sole Remedy for
Employment Discrimination Claims on the Basis of Sex.
Courts in the Fifth Circuit have consistently taken the opposite approach
from the Third Circuit in deciding possible joint liability cases under Title
VII and Title IX.41 In the Fifth Circuit case Lakoski v. James, the claim that
Congress intended for Title IX to offer a way to circumvent the
administrative remedial process carefully crafted under Title VII did not
persuade the court.42 The court held that it could not say that Title IX
provided a remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to indicate by itself
that Congress intended to resolve employment discrimination claims via
Title IX as opposed to Title VII.43 The Fifth Circuit consequently denied
claims brought by an employee of a medical university under Title IX,
asserting that Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for claims brought by
individuals alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex.44
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit claimed that allowing employees to bring a
private right of action under Title IX would undermine Title VII’s “carefully
balanced remedial scheme for redressing employment discrimination.”45
The district court in Doe v. Mercy Catholic also agreed with the Fifth
Circuit by asserting that there could be no joint liability under Title IX for
employees in private institutions that receive federal funds and engage in
some sort of educational program or activity.46 The district court’s assertion
Doe, 850 F.3d at 562-63.
41. See Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 753, 758 (5th Cir. 1995) (delineating that
Congress enacted Title VII to provide a remedy for victims of employment
discrimination and enacted Title IX to enable federal agencies to withhold federal funds).
42. See id. at 752-53, 758 (stating that a professor filed suit against appellant medical
school alleging that the denial of her tenure was based on sexual discrimination in
violation of Title IX).
43. Compare id. at 754 (commenting that the only remedy expressly provided in
Title IX is the termination of federal funds to an education institution that fails to
adequately address allegations of known sexual harassment), with North Haven Bd. of
Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 552 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that Title IX
explicitly contains only the one remedy of termination of funds to educational
institutions).
44. Lakoski at 753, 758 (determining the main avenue for resolving claims of
discrimination based on sex is through Title VII administrative process and not Title IX).
45. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d. at 755 (ruling that Congress did not intend for Title IX to
be a mechanism in which employees could bypass Title VII’s carefully balanced
remedial scheme).
46. See Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 158 F. Supp. 3d 256, 260-61 (E.D. Pa. 2016)
(finding that extending Title IX’s coverage to the residency program in question would,
in effect, rewrite the statute and overstep the bounds of judicial restraint).
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further supports the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that Title VII provides a robust
remedial process meant to serve as the sole method of relief for individuals
alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex.47
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Fifth Circuit Correctly Determined that Title VII Provides the Sole
Remedy for Individuals Seeking Relief for Employment Discrimination on
the Basis of Sex in Federally Funded Educational Institutions.
The Fifth Circuit correctly determined that Title VII offers the appropriate
and sole remedy to victims of employment discrimination on the basis of
sex.48 The Fifth Circuit’s thorough analysis concluded that Congress did not
enact Title IX to provide a bypass to Title VII’s specific and well-established
remedial administrative procedures.49 The Fifth Circuit highlighted three
reasons why Title VII affords the exclusive remedy for claims of
employment discrimination on the basis of sex.50 First, the circuit court
established that it does not believe that Congress intended for Title IX to be
a bypass for Title VII’s well-established remedial procedures.51 Second, the
court disagreed that the aggregate of Cannon v. University of Chicago, North
Haven Board of Education v. Bell, and Franklin v. Gwinnet County Public
Schools added up to an implied right of action that provides an implied
remedy under Title IX.52 The Fifth Circuit also distinguished these three
47. See id.; Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754, 756 (affirming that Title VII provides the sole
remedy for individuals alleging sex-based employment discrimination because Congress
did not intend for Title IX to provide a bypass to Title VII’s well-established
administrative remedial process).
48. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 751, 752 (reversing the judgment of the district court in
favor of the university).
49. See id. at 753 (limiting the Court’s holding only to individuals seeking money
damages).
50. See id. at 753-54 (explaining the reasons why Title IX is not the appropriate
remedy for victims of employment discrimination who could also bring a claim under
Title VII).
51. See id. at 753; (noting that although the plaintiff had a colorable claim under
Title VII, she did not pursue administrative remedies under that Title); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(d)-(f) (2009) (establishing a specific administrative process that requires an
individual to pursue administrative remedies before pursuing judicial redress).
52. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754 (rejecting Lakoski’s “jurisprudential arithmetic” and
not finding an implied remedy for employees discriminated on the basis of sex because
the cases did not address the relationship between Title VII and Title IX). But see Cannon
v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979) (finding an implied private cause of action
under Title IX for an individual against universities); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell,
456 U.S. 512, 535 n.26 (1982) (affirming that employment discrimination at educational
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cases from the facts and legal questions presented in Lakoski v. James,
specifically in relation to the analysis of Title VII and Title IX remedial
processes.53 Third, the court argues that “Title IX provides limited remedies
for victims of employment discrimination.”54
1. The Fifth Circuit’s Reading of Title VII and Title IX Correctly
Establishes that Congress Intended Title VII to be the Primary Remedial
Measure for Employment Discrimination Claims.
Both circuits analyzed congressional intent to varying degrees, but the
Fifth Circuit provided the more compelling argument to support Congress’s
remedial intent.55 The Fifth Circuit relied more heavily on its discussion of
congressional intent for two parts of its analysis.56 The Third Circuit only
discussed congressional intent in the second part of its four-part argument
and thus did not sufficiently address Congress’s intent for what remedies
should exist under each statute.57 The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by
bringing to light the explicit remedial process that exists under Title VII; the
same process which was circumvented in Lakoski.58 The Fifth Circuit was
not persuaded that Congress created Title IX to be a bypass of Title VII’s
administrative process.59 The Third Circuit, on the other hand, improperly
asserted that Title VII’s concurrent applicability does not hinder Doe’s
ability to seek relief under Title IX.60
institutions receiving federal funds falls under Title IX) ; Franklin v. Gwinnet Cty. Pub.
Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (finding that actions for money damages may be brought
through the implied right of action under Title IX).
53. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754 (emphasizing that in the three referenced cases, Title
VII was not implicated).
54. See id. (explaining that the sole remedy for expressly stated in Title IX is the
termination of federal funds).
55. See id.; see also Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 559, 564 (3d
Cir. 2017) (questioning whether Congress intended for Title IX to bypass Title VII’s
remedial scheme by allowing individuals to seek relief under Title IX for employment
discrimination claims that could also be brought under Title VII).
56. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 755-57 (comparing the legislative histories of Title IX
and Title VII).
57. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 562 (arguing that this remedial issue is a matter of “policy,”
which courts have held need to be addressed by Congress, and not decided by the courts).
58. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753 (referring to Title VII’s well-established remedial
scheme that requires individuals to first seek administrative remedies before seeking
redress in the courts).
59. See id.
60. Compare id. at 758 (concluding that Title VII and Title IX contain the same
prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of sex, but Congress did not intend to

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law,

11

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3

84

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 27:1

The Fifth Circuit broke down its congressional intent analysis into two
portions.61 In the first portion, the court effectively concluded that Congress
intended for Title VII to include the primary damage remedy and therefore
excluded a damage remedy under Title IX for individuals submitting a claim
of employment discrimination.62 The court relied on Great American
Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny and Brown v. GSA to establish
that Title VII is the exclusive remedy in cases where the right violated was
initially created by Title VII because both cases stressed that a more
“precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies.”63 In
the second portion, the Fifth Circuit discussed the remedies that Congress
wrote into Title VII and Title IX.64
The Third Circuit failed to properly analyze congressional intent and
consequently failed to acknowledge that Congress intended for Title VII to
be the sole relief for employment discrimination in educational institutions
receiving federal financial assistance.65 The Third Circuit primarily
discussed congressional intent through the second prong of the four
principles the court derived to support its decision.66 The court cited Brown
v. GSA and distinguished it from Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.
to wrongly imply that Johnson points to Title VII not preempting other

create mechanisms under Title IX with which individuals could bypass preexisting Title
VII remedies), with Doe, 850 F.3d at 563-64, 566 (concluding that Doe could bring her
retaliation and quid pro quo harassment claims under Title IX, but not reaching the
hostile environment claim because it was time-barred).
61. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754-57 (analyzing which remedies Congress and
subsequent case law expressly provided remedies under Title IX and remedies Title VII).
62. See id. at 756, 758 (finding that Title VII’s extension to local and state
governments meant that Title IX did not intend to create a bypass for Title VII’s remedial
scheme).
63. See id. at 755. Compare Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976) (establishing
that Title VII preempts § 1985 actions because otherwise a complainant would be able
to avoid most if not all of Title VII’s remedial administrative process), with Great Am.
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 378 (1979) (holding that a violation
of Title VII cannot also be a cause of action under § 1985(3)).
64. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754, 756 (illustrating the contrast between remedies
under Title VII, which allow individuals to seek redress for claims of employment
discrimination, with remedies under Title IX, which allow federal agencies to withhold
funding from educational institutions that do not address claims of employment
discrimination brought against them).
65. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 562 (finding that Title IX’s private cause of action applies
to employees, as well as students, of federally funded educational institutions).
66. See id. at 562 (arguing that this issue is a matter of “policy” that should be
decided by Congress and not decided in the courts).
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available remedies in private employment.67 Through this assertion, the
Third Circuit missed the opportunity to thoroughly address congressional
intent and instead inadequately used the precedent in North Haven and
Johnson to argue that the Supreme Court has refused to decide on policybased rationales.68
2. A Private Right of Action for Damages Is Not Established Under Title
IX Because the Cases Used by the Third Circuit are Distinguished from the
Lakoski Case and a Well-Established Private Remedy Already Exists
Under Title VII.
The district court in Lakoski introduced three Supreme Court decisions to
argue that, when read together, these cases allow for a private right of action
to seek damages for employment discrimination claims under Title IX.69 The
Fifth Circuit correctly rejected the assertion that these cases amounted to an
implied right of action because all three of these cases failed to address the
relationship between the remedial processes established in Title VII and Title
IX.70 The Third Circuit failed to acknowledge and analyze the precedent set
in Lakoski thoroughly and used the cases North Haven Board of Education
v. Bell and Cannon v. University of Chicago in an attempt to once again
construct a private right of action that allows for individuals to recover
damages under Title IX.71
67. See id. at 560-61 (noting that the court considered Johnson inapposite in Brown
because private employment does not raise sovereign immunity issues). Compare
Brown, 425 U.S. at 835 (1976), (holding that Title VII provides the exclusive remedy to
federal employees for claims of employment discrimination), with Johnson v. Ry.
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (suggesting that a victim of employment
discrimination is not limited to Title VII when seeking relief).
68. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 562 (dismissing the issue of bypassing Title VII’s remedial
scheme as a matter of policy that the Court should not rule on); Johnson, 421 U.S. at
459; (declining to express a preference for one remedy over another without
Congressional guidance); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982)
(arguing that once Congress has made a decision about a policy matter, the Court is not
free to ignore that decision).
69. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753-54; Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 749
(1979) (holding that individuals denied admission on the basis of sex to an educational
institution have an implied private right of action under Title IX); North Haven, 456 U.S.
at 538 (upholding Title IX regulations prohibiting sex-based employment discrimination
in federally funded educational institutions); Franklin v. Gwinnet Cty. Pub. Schs., 503
U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (holding that a student harassed by her teacher could seek monetary
damages in a private claim under Title IX).
70. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754 (distinguishing Cannon and Franklin because neither
case involved a claim of employee discrimination).
71. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 562 (finding that employees are encompassed by Title IX’s
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The Fifth Circuit was correct to dismiss Lakoski’s argument on the basis
that these cases were distinguished from the facts and legal premises set out
in the Lakoski case.72 The Fifth Circuit pointed out that North Haven,
Franklin, and Cannon each failed to address the relationship between the
remedial processes outlined in Title VII and Title IX, and specifically
Franklin and Cannon, did not involve a claim of employment discrimination
in a federally funded educational institution.73 In North Haven, the court
held that employment discrimination on the basis of sex is included within
Title IX’s broad discrimination prohibition.74 Although this case thoroughly
analyzed Congress’s intent to extend Title IX to protect employees of
educational institutions, the court does not conduct this analysis in relation
to Title VII’s preexisting protections of this same class of employees.75 In
Cannon, the court analyzed whether an implied right of action existed in the
absence of an express right of action.76 The application of the Cort v. Ash
test determined whether Congress did intend to include an implied right of
action for a certain class of individuals.77 The court’s analysis, however, did
not include any mention of Title VII.78 Therefore, the court did not properly
consider Congress’s intent in relation to a right already existing expressly

private cause of action because the statutory language does not expressly exclude them).
72. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754 (refusing to acknowledge that Cannon, North Haven
and Franklin amounted to a private right of action available to victims of employment
discrimination on the basis of sex).
73. See id. (distinguishing North Haven, Franklin, and Cannon from Lakoski
because the cases did not directly involve a discussion around Title VII’s remedial
scheme while in Lakoski, circumventing Title VII’s remedial scheme is the central issue).
74. See North Haven, 456 U.S. at 530 (holding that although Title IX does not
expressly protect employees of federally funded educational programs or activities, the
statute implies a broad intention to include any individual in the educational program or
activity).
75. See id. at 537-38 (relying on Title IX’s “program-specific” language and
legislative history to affirm its extension to employees without addressing how this
affects preexisting remedies applying to the same class of individuals).
76. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 678 (1979) (holding that even if Title
IX does not expressly provide a private cause of action, courts may still find that
Congress implied one by analyzing the statute with the four-steps from Cort v. Ash).
77. See id. at 688-89; see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (establishing the
four factors that would indicate Congressional intent: (1) whether the statute is meant to
benefit a special class of which the plaintiff belongs, (2) whether there is legislative intent
to create a private remedy, (3) whether the remedy is consistent with the purposes of the
legislation, and (4) whether implying a federal remedy is inappropriate because it
concerns the States).
78. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol27/iss1/3

14

Martinez: Following the Fifth Circuit

2018]

FOLLOWING THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

87

under Title VII.79 Finally, in Franklin, the court held that relief through
monetary damages was allowed under Title IX because any appropriate relief
is available to remedy the violation of a federal right.80 The court in Franklin
relied heavily on the Cannon decision and similarly failed to consider the
preexisting, well-established remedies available under Title VII for victims
of employment discrimination on the basis of sex.81
The Third Circuit failed to directly address the Fifth Circuit’s dismissal of
a private right of action under Title IX and instead attempted to reestablish
this right by arguing that Congress meant to paint Title IX’s remedial
measures with a broad stroke so as to not exclude employees in educational
institutions that receive federal financial assistance.82 The Third Circuit
incorrectly concluded that Title IX’s lack of explicit or implied exclusion of
employees demonstrates that Congress intended for “persons” to include
employees because “Congress easily could have substituted ‘student’ or
‘beneficiary’ for the word ‘person’ if it had wished to restrict” Title IX’s
remedial scope.83 The Third Circuit’s holding directly contradicts the Fifth
Circuit’s holding regarding the application of Cannon and North Haven to
reach the conclusion that an implied right of action exists under Title IX.84
Additionally, the Third Circuit inadequately extended its analysis to include
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education to support the assertion that the
implied private cause of action derived from North Haven and Cannon
explicitly extended to employees of educational institutions that receive
federal financial assistance.85 The Third Circuit incorrectly applied the
79. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 695-96 (comparing Title IX’s implied rights with Title
VI’s implied but not its express rights).
80. See Franklin v. Gwinnet Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (determining
that monetary damages were an appropriate relief under Title IX for individuals who
were victims of discrimination on the basis of sex).
81. See id. at 72 (noting that in three previous cases where the Court found an implied
right, it also found approved monetary damages, without mentioning Title VII).
82. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (arguing that
Title IX’s private right of action includes not only students but employees as well).
83. See Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 562 (3d Cir. 2017) (interpreting
Congress’s lack of an explicit or implied exclusion of “employees” to mean that
Congress intended for employees to be included under Title IX’s remedial measures).
84. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 709; North Haven, 456 U.S. at 535; see also Lakoski v.
James, 66 F.3d 751, 754 (5th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing the facts in Cannon and North
Haven to determine that these cases presented legal questions in which Title VII was not
directly implicated and therefore did not adequately address the relationship between
Title VII and Title IX).
85. Compare Doe, 850 F.3d at 562-63 (maintaining that the Jackson case supports a
wide reading of Title IX to include all individuals who are victims of intentional sex
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Jackson case because the court failed to adequately address the Fifth
Circuit’s pre-established argument that North Haven, Franklin, and Cannon
do not amount to a private right of action under Title IX.86
3. Title VII Expressly Provides Individuals with Administrative and
Judicial Remedies While Title IX Expressly Provides Federal Agencies with
the Ability to Withhold Funds to Address Known Employment
Discrimination.
The second part of the Fifth Circuit’s congressional intent analysis
addressed the express and implied remedies that Congress intended to
provide under Title VII and Title IX.87 The court carefully looked at the
legislative histories to determine what Congress meant to accomplish with
each statute.88 The Fifth Circuit correctly concluded that although Congress
essentially created two remedies for the same right, it did so by tailoring the
remedies available to different individuals.89 The remedies Congress created
under each statute supported the Fifth Circuit’s compelling reasoning for
which statute should be used to protect victims in different instances of
discrimination on the basis of sex.90 The Fifth Circuit determined that
Congress created a more robust and detailed remedy under Title VII in order
for individuals like the plaintiff in Lakoski to seek relief under this statute

discrimination), with Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 175 (2005)
(clarifying that Title IX’s broad prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex includes
narrow exceptions, and an implied private right of action for victims of retaliation is not
one of these narrow exceptions).
86. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 562 (finding an implied private right of action under Title
IX by relying on an application of Jackson and Gwinnett).
87. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 755-57 (distinguishing between Title VII, which provides
a remedy to individual victims of employment discrimination, and Title IX, which
provides a remedy by which administrative agencies can withhold federal funds from
educational institutions that do not address allegations of discrimination).
88. Compare id. (analyzing the timeline of Title VII’s extension to local and state
government employees as well as concluding that Congress did not intend for Title IX
to be a mechanism which could be used to circumvent preexisting Title VII remedies),
with Doe, 850 F.3d at 562 (declaring that the issue of whether an individual could
circumvent Title VII’s remedial process was a policy issue that Congress has not
expressly settled but that is up to Congress to address).
89. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 757 (concluding that Congress meant to provide
individuals facing discrimination with administrative and judicial remedies under Title
VII, and to empower federal agencies to withhold federal funds from educational
institutions that fail to address employment discrimination).
90. See id. (explaining Title IX was intended to bolster the existing prohibitions on
sex discrimination under Title VII).
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instead of under other less robust and established statutes such as Title IX.91
First, the Fifth Circuit adequately pointed out that Congress created only
one main remedy expressly stated under Title IX.92 The Fifth Circuit
concluded that among Title IX’s limited remedies, Congress only expressly
provided the termination of federal financial assistance as the remedy for
violations of Title IX.93 In Doe v. Mercy Catholic, the Third Circuit did not
adequately analyze the implications surrounding the conclusions various
courts have reached and thus also failed to fully explore the relationship
between the remedial schemes of each statute.94 Second, the Fifth Circuit
discussed separate cases in which courts have found that Title VII preempts
Section 1983 and Section 1985 suits based on violations of Title VII rights.95
The Fifth Circuit was correct in using Title IX’s limited remedial scheme
along with the cases that hold Title VII to preempt other less specific
remedies to conclude that Title VII also preempts the less specific Title IX
remedial scheme.96
In the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of Title VII as related to Section 1983
claims, the court used Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v.
Novotny to correctly establish that in a fact pattern similar to the Lakoski
case, the Supreme Court ruled that Title VII preempts other remedies that if
asserted could circumvent Title VII’s remedial administrative scheme.97 The
91. See id. at 755-56 (reasoning that Congress intended to strengthen the already
existing Title VII prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex in federally
funded educational institutions through Title IX but did not intend for Title IX to be a
way for individuals to circumvent Title VII’s established remedial procedures).
92. Compare id. at 754-55, with Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 667, 717 (1979)
(finding an implied remedy in Title IX, although it was not expressly provided in the
statute), and Franklin v. Gwinnet Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (holding that
individuals can seek relief under Title IX for claims of intentional discrimination).
93. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012) (discussing the
protections available to victims of sex-based discrimination).
94. See Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 560, 563 (3d. Cir. 2017)
(overlooking the role that Title VII’s remedial scheme plays in relation to Title IX’s
remedial process).
95. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 755 (declaring through these cases that the wellestablished remedial structure of Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for Title VII
rights); see also Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 377 (1979)
(holding that Title VII precludes § 1985 claims when these claims are sought in violation
of a Title VII right); Irby v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1418, 1428 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that
Title VII precludes § 1983 claims).
96. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 755 (questioning Title IX’s limited remedies and holding
that Title VII’s established remedies preclude more general and less established statutory
remedies).
97. See id. at 755 (determining that for rights created under Title VII, Title VII
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Novotny case, along with the Brown v. GSA case, supports the Fifth Circuit’s
correct assertion that Congress created Title VII’s remedial scheme with the
purpose of creating a “precisely drawn, detailed statute” that “preempts more
general remedies.”98 Since the Third Circuit did not thoroughly consider the
precedent set by the Fifth Circuit, the Third Circuit failed to address why
Title IX should be a bypass to Title VII’s established remedial process.99
B. The Third Circuit Incorrectly Decided Doe v. Mercy Catholic Because
It Failed to Distinguish Jackson from Lakoski and Failed to Address the
Federal Financial Assistance Requirement.
1. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of
Education is Distinguished from Lakoski v. James.
The Third Circuit determined that a medical resident could bring a claim
under Title IX without having to bring a claim under Title VII.100 The Third
Circuit relied on Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education to hold that the
implied right of action the court derived from Cannon and North Haven
extended to “employees of federally-funded education programs who allege
sex-based retaliation claims under Title IX.”101 An important distinction
noted by the Third Circuit is that Jackson was decided after the Fifth Circuit
decided Lakoski in 1995.102 The Third Circuit ineffectively relies on the
Jackson decision to support its holding without considering that this case is
provides the exclusive remedy).
98. See Novotny, 442 U.S. at 377; Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976)
(extrapolating that Congress wrote specific rights and remedial structures into Title VII
with the express purpose of Title VII preempting less specific remedial measures that
seek to provide relief for the violation of rights created under Title VII).
99. Compare Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 755 (maintaining that Title IX’s limited remedial
structure only expressly includes the termination of federal funding), with Doe, 850 F.3d
at 560, 563 (overlooking Title VII’s well-established remedial scheme as compared to
Title IX’s limited remedial scheme).
100. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 563-64 (concluding that employees of educational
institutions that receive financial funds have a private right of action under Title IX
regardless of whether they could also bring that claim under Title VII).
101. See id. at 562 (emphasis added) (arguing specifically that retaliation against an
employee for complaining about an instance of discrimination on the basis of sex is
intentional sex discrimination); see also Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S.
167, 171 (2005); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982); Cannon
v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 690-92 (1979).
102. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 563 (contrasting the assertion in Jackson that Title IX
beneficiaries include anyone subjected to sex-based discrimination with the Fifth Circuit
assertion ten years prior in Lakoski that Title VII is the sole remedy for medical residents
who are victims of sex-based employment discrimination).
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legally distinguished from Lakoski because Jackson does not adequately
analyze the relationship between Title VII’s and Title IX’s remedial
measures and procedures.103
The Fifth Circuit properly dismissed the argument in Lakoski regarding
the aggregate of the Cannon, Franklin, and North Haven cases because each
of these cases did not thoroughly acknowledge and analyze the relationship
between Title IX and Title VII in relation to each statute’s remedial
procedures.104 In contrast with these three cases, the court in Jackson did
address, to a limited extent, the relationship between Title VII and Title IX
in terms of the remedial procedures expressed and implied in each statute.105
The Third Circuit adopted for a broader reading of Title IX as espoused in
Jackson and which allows Title IX to extend to all individuals and not just
individuals who cannot succeed on a Title VII claim.106 The Third Circuit
was wrong in its analysis because, in Jackson, the Supreme Court held that
Title VII and Title IX are vastly different statutes and did not address the
relationship between each statute’s remedial measures.107 Although the
court briefly touched on the relationship between these two statutes, this
analysis did not adequately address whether Title IX could be used to bypass
Title VII’s remedial procedures.108

103. See id. at 562 (rationalizing that if recipients of federal financial assistance could
retaliate freely, then individuals who witness sex-based discrimination in the institutions
where they work would be dissuaded from reporting the discrimination).
104. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753-54 (rejecting Lakoski’s claims that the aggregate of
the Cannon, North Haven, and Franklin cases create an implied right of action because
these cases failed to address Title IX in relation to Title VII).
105. See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174-75 (comparing Title IX’s broad language, which
implicitly prohibits retaliation against someone who complains about discrimination on
the basis of sex, with Title VII’s express and specific prohibitions against retaliation
against someone who complains about employment discrimination).
106. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 563 (noting that Congress’s use of the broad term
“discrimination” indicates its intention to allow this statute to broadly cover individuals
who experience a wide range of intentional unequal treatment on the basis of sex).
107. See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 168, 175 (explaining that Title VII’s prohibition against
retaliation is expressly mentioned while Title IX does not expressly mention this
prohibition because Title IX is written as a broad prohibition against discrimination and
includes exceptions to this broad prohibition while Title VII was written to specifically
list the conduct it covers).
108. See id. at 175 (finding that since “Congress did not list any specific
discriminatory practices when it wrote Title IX, its failure to mention one such practice
does not tell us anything about whether it intended that practice to be covered.”).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law,

19

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3

92

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 27:1

2. The Third Circuit Incorrectly Decided Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical
Center Because Receiving Medicaid Funds that Stem from Contracts of
Insurance Does Not Meet the Standard of Receiving Federal Financial
Assistance Required by Title IX.
The Third Circuit did not address in depth whether the type of funds
received by Mercy Catholic Medical Center meet the standard required to be
considered an educational institution receiving federal funds as required by
Title IX.109 In Doe, the Third Circuit assumed that Mercy Catholic received
federal financial assistance even when the medical center argued that the
Medicare payments intended to supplement residency training costs instead
“stem from contracts of insurance.”110 Mercy Catholic denied that the
federal funds received would qualify as the federal funds required by Title
IX.111
The Third Circuit did not address the issue that the Medicare payments
Mercy Catholic receives do not meet the necessary standard of federal
financial funds because Mercy Catholic did not raise this issue in the district
court.112 However, this question may guide future courts to distinguish the
Third Circuit’s incorrect decision and correctly side with the Fifth Circuit’s
opposing view.113 The Third Circuit emphasized the importance and farreaching effects that its decision could have on future cases.114
The Third Circuit incorrectly interpreted the “contracts of insurance” to
mean traditional contracts such as those involving “individual bank accounts

109. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-82 (2012) (defining “federal financial assistance” to
include the award or grant of money or other assistance in nonmonetary funds, but not
contracts of guaranty or insurance by the federal government).
110. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 558 (denying review of Mercy Catholic’s argument in the
circuit court because Mercy Catholic did not raise the issue in the district court).
111. See id. at 558; see also Brief for Appellee at 25, Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr.,
850 F.3d 545 (3d. Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1247) (arguing that the Medicare funds received
by Mercy Catholic fall under the express exclusion of the type of federal financial
assistance statutorily required under Title IX).
112. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 558 (declining to address this argument in accordance to
procedural rules and sending the issue back to the lower courts to decide).
113 . See Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 758 (5th Cir. 1995); Waid v. Merrill Area
Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 865-66 n.4 (7th Cir. 1996) abrogated in part by Fitzgerald v.
Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009); Preston v. Virginia, 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir.
1994) (disagreeing on whether employees at private medical residency programs that
receive federal funds have concurrent liability under Title IV and Title IX).
114. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 552 (emphasizing that this question of first impression
touches on the administrative power to address gender discrimination in medical
residency programs through existing federal law).
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in a bank with federally guaranteed deposits.”115 The Third Circuit’s
assumption that the Medicaid contract payments qualify as “federal financial
assistance” is incorrect and could lead future courts to distinguish the Third
Circuit’s argument that Title VII and Title IX provide concurrent liability for
victims of employment discrimination to be able to seek relief under both
statutes.116 If the Medicare payments received by Mercy Catholic are indeed
contracts of insurance, then they would be a type of federal financial
assistance that is expressly excluded from the Title IX definition of federal
financial funds.117 Regulations under Title IX clarify the types of payments
that qualify as federal financial assistance and specifically states that federal
financial assistance includes “[a]ny other contract, agreement, or
arrangement that has as one of its purposes the provision of assistance to any
education program or activity, except a contract of insurance or guaranty.”118
In Footnote 2 of Mercy Catholic’s appellee brief, Mercy Catholic Medical
Center asserts that the payments made through the Medicare and Medicaid
programs are defined as federal health insurance programs.119 Doe and the
amicus brief filed in favor of Doe, argue that the Medicare and Medicaid
insurance funds qualify as Graduate Medical Education (“GME”) funding
and thus meet the threshold of federal financial assistance required to
establish Title IX liability.120 On the other hand, Mercy Catholic argues that
115. Id. at 558 (contending that all federal civil rights statutes intend to refer to
contracts in the traditional meaning of the term) (citing United States v. Baylor Univ.
Med. Ctr., 736 F.2d 1039, 1048 (5th Cir. 1984)).
116. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 558 (presuming without deciding that Mercy Catholic
receives the type of “federal financial assistance” statutorily required under Title IX,
leaving it for the district court to address on remand).
117. See 20 U.S.C. § 1685 (2012) (requiring the educational program or activity to
receive federal financial assistance in order for it to fall under the purview of Title IX);
see also 45 C.F.R. § 618.105 (2012) (defining “federal financial assistance” as excluding
federal contracts of guaranty or insurance).
118. See 45 C.F.R. § 618.105 (2012) (defining “federal financial funds” and providing
the statutory exclusions for the types of funds and payments that do not qualify as federal
financial assistance to an educational program or activity as required under Title IX).
119. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 111, at 25 n.2 (noting that federal insurance
is a type of guarantee of insurance that is excluded from Title IX); see also 42 U.S.C. §
1395; Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 506-07 (1994) (noting
that Medicare is a federally funded health insurance program for elderly and disabled
patients).
120. See Brief for Appellant at 13, Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (3d.
Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1247); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Plaintiff-Appellant at 13-14, Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (3d. Cir. 2017)
(No. 16-1247) (defining GME funding as direct or indirect payments received through
the Federal Medicare program to cover the costs related to educating medical residents).
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the GME payments funded through Medicare and Medicaid payments
qualify as “contracts of insurance” and are thus explicitly excluded as the
type of federal financial assistance required under Title IX.121 In its brief,
Mercy stated that it receives its federal financial payments directly from the
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) for services rendered to
elderly and disabled patients.122 Mercy clarifies that “[t]he GME payments
are not ‘federal assistance,’ but rather, federal health insurance payments
made directly to the hospital on behalf of the elderly and disabled patients to
whom Mercy has provided hospital services.”123
In Footnote 2, Mercy Catholic Medical Center asserts that whether
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements constitute payments under a federal
contract has not been addressed or resolved in conjunction with the statutory
requirements expressed under Title IX.124 While the Third Circuit, in
following procedural rules, does not address this argument, it still explains
that the contracts of insurance brought up in Mercy Catholic’s brief tend to
refer to traditional contracts “like those involving ‘individual bank accounts
in a bank with federally guaranteed deposits.’”125 The Third Circuit’s
explanation is wrong because these contracts of insurance are expressly the
kind that are included as a statutory exception under Title IX.126

121. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 111, at 7-8 n.2.
122. Id. at 7-8; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(a)(4) (regarding the classification of

federal payments to hospitals for different types of inpatient services).
123. See Brief for Appellee at 7-8 n. 2, Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545
(3d. Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1247); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h) (2018); 42 U.S.C. §
1395ww(d)(5)(B) (2018) (addressing the direct and indirect costs for which HHS
provides reimbursements to medical hospitals which include the costs of graduate
medical education).
124. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 111, at 7-8 n.2 (noting that in Henschke v.
New York Hosp. Cornell Med. Ctr., 821 F. Supp. 166, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), the district
court held in abeyance the question of whether Title IX covered the university hospital
based on whether the hospital receives the type of federal financial assistance required
to meet the requirements of Title IX).
125. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 558 (assuming without discussion that these types of
contracts of insurance should be treated as traditional contracts) (citing United States v.
Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 736 F.2d 1039, 1048 (5th Cir. 1984)).
126. Compare Brief for Appellee, supra note 111, at 7-8 n.2 (arguing the Medicare
payments received to support the teaching hospital are contracts of insurance that do not
meet the definition of federal financial funds required under Title IX), with 45 C.F.R. §
618.105 (1972) (defining “federal financial funds” and providing the statutory exclusions
under Title IX).

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol27/iss1/3

22

Martinez: Following the Fifth Circuit

2018]

FOLLOWING THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

95

III. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
The Third Circuit’s decision that remedial joint liability exists under Title
VII and Title IX should not set a precedent for future courts.127 The attempt
to broadly apply Title IX to instances of discrimination already covered
under Title VII goes against the interest of strengthening protections for
victims of sexual harassment in the workplace. Applying Title IX’s less
established and unclear remedial process could yield inconsistent results in
the courts. Title IX does not provide for a clear set of procedural guidelines
that could be applied consistently and thoroughly to employment
discrimination claims.128 Instead, Title IX relies on clarification from the
Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) to interpret
Congress’s intent through nonbinding policy documents.129
The Fifth Circuit’s legal conclusion that Title VII is the sole remedy for
victims of employment discrimination on the basis of sex supports the
compelling policy interest that Title VII’s robust remedial scheme should not
be weakened by the creation of competing remedies.130 Congress expressly
created the rights and supported these rights with a robust remedial scheme
under Title VII to protect victims of sex-based discrimination in the
workplace.131 Title VII provides a solid set of remedial measures that should
not be undermined by seeking relief through other recourses, especially if
these recourses are more general and less established.132 To strengthen the
protections for victims of employment discrimination on the basis of sex,
127. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 560 (holding that Title VII and Title IX allow for joint
liability under which employees could seek relief for employment discrimination using
either statute).
128. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2012) (codifying into law protections against
discrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs or activities that receive
federal financial assistance).
129. See, e.g., See, e.g., Dear Colleague Letter from Candice Jackson, Acting
Assistant Sec'y for the Office of Civil Rights, Dep't of Educ. 1 (Sept. 22, 2017) (on file
with Dep't of Educ.) (implementing Title IX’s regulatory requirements through
nonbinding policy manuals and guidance).
130. See Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 758 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that Title VII
provides the sole remedy for individuals alleging employment discrimination on the basis
of sex and that Congress did not intend for Title IX to provide a bypass to Title VII’s
well-established administrative remedial process).
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2010) (codifying protections against discrimination on
the basis of sex in the workplace); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2018) (establishing sexual
harassment as a violation of section 703 of Title VII).
132. See id. (providing a robust, congressionally mandated administrative and judicial
process for individuals who have experienced employment discrimination on the basis
of sex).
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future courts should determine that Title VII preempts all other less
established remedies for the rights initially created under Title VII.133
IV. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit correctly decided that Title VII is the sole avenue for
individuals to file claims of employment discrimination on the basis of sex
in educational institutions such as medical residency programs that receive
federal financial assistance.134 The Fifth Circuit used a three-part test to
comprehensively analyze the role of Title VII and Title IX and correctly
determine that Title VII provides the most adequate and consequently sole
remedy.135 First, the court analyzed the congressional intent and determined
that Congress did not intend to create a bypass to Title VII’s robust remedial
process through the provisions established by Title IX.136 Second, the court
determined that the aggregate of Cannon v. University of Chicago, North
Haven Board of Education v. Bell, and Franklin v. Gwinnet County Public
Schools cases did not create an implied right of action that provides a remedy
under Title IX.137 Finally, the court concluded that Title IX’s limited
established remedies for claims of employment discrimination on the basis
of sex indicate that Title VII was created as the main procedural avenue
under which to bring these claims.138 As such, the Fifth Circuit was correct
in concluding that Title VII’s remedial process preempts Title IX and is the
sole remedy for claims of employment discrimination on the basis of sex.

133. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 755 (holding that Title VII’s precise, comprehensive, and
well-established remedial process preempts Title IX’s unclear and unestablished
remedial process).
134. See id. at 758 (concluding that Title VII is the sole remedy for employment
discrimination on the basis of sex for rights created under Title VII).
135. See id. at 758 (concluding that Title VII’s well-established remedial process
preempts other less specific remedies).
136. Compare id. at 758 (employing a two-step congressional intent analysis that
pointed to Congress not intending for Title IX to provide a bypass to Title VII’s remedial
process), with Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 560-63 (3d. Cir. 2017)
(overlooking congressional intent relating to the relationship between Title VII’s and
Title IX’s remedial processes).
137. See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753 (dismissing with the argument that the aggregate of
the Cannon, North Haven, and Franklin cases create an implied right of action because
these cases failed to address Title IX in relation to Title VII).
138. See id. at 754 (establishing that the only remedy expressly provided in Title IX
is the termination of federal funds to an educational institution that fails to adequately
address allegations of known sexual harassment).
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